BAGHDAD — Iran has delivered a formal diplomatic demarche to Iraq demanding immediate action against camps operated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala party in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), according to Iraqi government officials who spoke to Tehran Dispatch.

The demarche, delivered by Iran's ambassador to Baghdad last week, followed a series of incidents that Tehran has attributed to cross-border infiltration by armed groups based in the KRI. Iran conducted at least three drone and missile strikes against positions near Sulaymaniyah in January and February, killing several fighters and injuring civilians in nearby villages.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani held emergency talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Baghdad on Tuesday, according to a statement from his office that described the discussions as "frank and constructive." No joint statement was issued, and the two sides gave conflicting characterisations of what was agreed.

The Kurdish Opposition Presence in Iraq

Several Iranian Kurdish political and military organisations have maintained bases in northern Iraq since the 1980s, when they fled after their armed uprising was crushed by the Islamic Republic. The groups have had an ambiguous relationship with Iraqi Kurdish authorities, who tolerate their presence but are wary of provoking Tehran, on whom they depend for trade and energy supplies.

Iran has long demanded that Iraq disarm and expel these groups, arguing that they serve as staging grounds for intelligence operations, propaganda, and, increasingly, cross-border armed attacks. The groups deny conducting offensive operations inside Iran proper, but acknowledge maintaining armed capabilities for self-defence.

The issue took on new urgency after the 2022 protests in Iran. Iranian security officials have accused the KRI-based groups of playing a coordination role in the uprising — an allegation the groups accept with some pride, while disputing Iranian claims about their specific operational involvement.

"We are a political organisation fighting for the rights of the Kurdish people in Iran. We support those who resist oppression. This is not terrorism — this is our right." — KDPI spokesperson, responding to Iran's accusations in a statement to Iran Report

Baghdad's Impossible Position

Iraq's central government is caught in an extremely difficult position. Iran is Iraq's largest trading partner and critical supplier of natural gas for its electricity grid — a dependence that Baghdad has repeatedly tried and failed to reduce. Iranian-aligned political parties and militia factions within Iraq's political system are powerful actors that no government can easily ignore.

At the same time, the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil operates with substantial autonomy and has its own complex relationship with Tehran. Kurdish leaders in Erbil are deeply reluctant to forcibly dismantle opposition camps, citing the political cost of being seen as doing Iran's bidding and the practical difficulty of operations against groups embedded in remote mountain terrain.

The KRG has previously tried to relocate opposition camps away from the Iranian border and has occasionally cooperated with Baghdad in joint operations — moves that provoked fierce criticism from Kurdish civil society and opposition parties who view the groups as resistance heroes.

Military Dimensions

Iran's cross-border strikes have been a recurring feature of the relationship. Tehran has struck targets in the KRI with ballistic missiles and drones on multiple occasions since 2022, including a high-profile attack in January 2024 that Iran framed as targeting "Israeli spy headquarters" near Erbil — a claim rejected by Kurdish and Iraqi officials.

These strikes have caused diplomatic crises that eventually blow over without lasting consequence, in part because Iraq has limited capacity to prevent Iranian military action and limited political will to break with Tehran over it.

Iraqi Kurds, however, are increasingly alarmed. Regional President Nechirvan Barzani has described Iranian strikes as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and called on the central government to seek international legal remedies. Several KRG officials have privately told Western diplomats that they see the Iranian pressure as an attempt to permanently eliminate any independent Kurdish political space near Iran's border.

The Economic Leverage

Iran supplies roughly a third of Iraq's electricity needs through gas pipelines and power interconnections. During the summer, when Iraqi demand peaks and domestic supply is insufficient, Iranian gas becomes critical. Iran has periodically curtailed these supplies during diplomatic disputes — a form of coercive leverage that Iraq's leaders are acutely aware of.

Iraq owes Iran approximately $10 billion in gas payments, a debt that U.S. sanctions complicate enormously. The U.S. has granted temporary waivers allowing Iraq to pay for Iranian energy, but these waivers are periodically renewed under political pressure — creating chronic uncertainty for both sides.

The gas dependency gives Tehran a powerful instrument that does not require military action: the implicit threat of supply disruption during a hot summer is enough to focus Baghdad's mind.

Looking Ahead

Diplomats familiar with the situation say the current crisis will likely follow the pattern of previous episodes: an Iranian ultimatum, partial Iraqi compliance, some visible Kurdish concessions, and a gradual de-escalation that leaves the underlying situation unchanged. None of the parties have an interest in a genuine rupture.

What has changed is the intensity of Iranian pressure and the domestic Iranian political dynamic. With talks over the nuclear deal at a critical juncture, hardline factions in Tehran that oppose any deal with the West are using the Kurdish issue to demonstrate strength and assert that Iran will not be vulnerable to external pressure. Cross-border strikes provide a visible demonstration of military capability and political resolve.

For ordinary people living near the border — Kurdish Iranians who cross to visit family, traders, and farmers — the result is heightened fear and uncertainty. Several villages on the Iraqi side have been evacuated as a precaution, and cross-border economic activity has declined sharply in the affected areas.